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Abstract
Many-valued logics are standardly dened by logical matrices. They are truth-
functional. In this paper non truth-functional many-valued semantics are presented,
in a philosophical and mathematical perspective.
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1 Introduction
The aim of this paper is to present a new tool for the study of logics, the
concept of non truth-functional many-valued semantics.
3
We begin, in a rst part, by a general discussion about many-valued logic
4
in order to show what is exactly the philosophical and mathematical meaning
of this concept, in which position it stands in the logical space.
In a second part we recall the denition of logical matrix and the standard
denition of many-valued logic based on this notion. It is important to have
these denitions here in order to properly understand the distinction between
truth-functional and non truth-functional many-valued semantics, and these
denitions are also worthy to x the terminology which can be misleading and
ambiguous.
1
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Non truth-functional many-valued semantics were introduced for the rst time some years
ago in one of my papers about non classical logics [3]. But in this paper they just appear
as a side notion.
In some sense the present paper is a sequel of two other papers ([6], [19]), although it
is self-contained. The paper [19] arose from a discussion about G.Malinowski's book on
many-valued logics [26]. This little book is a good presentation of standard many-valued
logic.
4
We will alternatively use the singular \many-valued logic" or the plural \many-valued
logics", depending on what we want to emphasize. The singular expression emphasizes
many-valued logics as a whole.
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Notions discussed informally in the rst part are given a precise meaning
here and in the third part where we properly dene the notion of non truth-
functional many-valued semantics and give some examples of such semantics.
2 Logical matrices = many-valued logic?
2.1 Logical matrices do not reduce to many-valued logic
Many-valued logics are ones of the most famous non-classical logics. They ap-
peared independently in the work of dierent people at the end of the XIXth /
beginning of the XXth century, mainly C.S.Peirce, E.Post and J. Lukasiewicz.
The work of  Lukasiewicz was without doubt the most inuential in the devel-
opment of many-valued logics. One of the reasons is that  Lukasiewicz's work
promoted the concept of logical matrix, central concept for the construction
of many-valued logics, implicit in the works of Peirce and Post. The concept
of logical matrix was posteriorly systematically used for the development of
many-valued logic.
Moreover the notion of logical matrix has been used not only to generate
many-valued logics. For example Bernays [2] used many-valued matrices at
the metalogical level to prove the independence of sets of axioms for classi-
cal propositional logic. It has also been used at the metamathematical level
by people like Kleene [24], Bochvar [13] or Girard [21]. It was the idea of
Tarski that the concept of logical matrix could be used as a basic tool for the
general theory of zero-order logics.
5
And in fact this concept really became
fundamental in the so-called \Polish logic".
6
So logical matrices do not reduce to many-valued logic. But what about
the converse: does many-valued logic reduce to logical matrices? To generate
many-valued logics do we need logical matrices?
2.2 Logical matrices do not violate the principle of bivalence
What is the denition of many-valued logic? One can dene a many-valued
logic as a logic which violates the principle of bivalence. But what it the
principle of bivalence? It can be stated as follows:
Principle of Bivalence A proposition is true or false: it cannot be true
and false, or neither true nor false.
5
In a footnote to the reedition of \Investigations into the sentential calculus" by
 Lukasiewicz and Tarski in Tarski's volume Logic, semantics, metamathematics, Tarski re-
calls that \the constructions of many-valued systems of logic described here, are entirely
due to  Lukasiewicz and should not be referred to  Lukasiewicz and Tarski." ([35], p.38). But
later on when the concept of matrix is introduced, he adds the following footnote: \The
view of matrix formation as a general method of constructing systems is due to Tarski"
([35], p.40).
6
About the general theory of zero-order logics, Polish logic and this terminology see [10].
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The interpretation of this principle is not necessarily obvious.
7
One can
for example seriously doubt that the standard many-valued logics challenge
this principle. The reason is the following: the principle of bivalence is present
in many-vaued matrices through the distinction between designated and un-
designated values, as stressed by G.Malinowski: \The matrix method inspired
by truth-tables embodies a distinct shadow of two-valuedness in the division
of the matrix universe into two subsets of designated and undesignated ele-
ments." ([26], (p.72)). This very distinction is crucial for the denitions of
logical truth and logical consequence.
When we have, for example, a many-valued matrix, with three values 0,
1/2, and 1, it is therefore misleading to call the value 0 true, the value 1 false
and the value 1/2, indeterminate, or true-false, etc. The designated values
must be considered as corresponding to truth, and the undesignated values
as corresponding to falsity, because logical truth is dened as \designated for
every valuation". The same many-valued matrix can generate totally dierent
logics according to the choice of designated/undesignated values. For example
 Lukasiewicz took only 1 as designated, but in the constructions of paraconsis-
tent logics people have taken 1/2 and 1 as designated (see [1], [20], [30], [31],
[37], [28]). To consider 1/2 as designated but not calling it truth can lead to
erroneous interpretations of the logic generated by the matrix (see [11]).
2.3 Suszko's distinction between algebraic values and logical values
The concept of logical consequence seems essentially bivalent (and also the
concept of logical truth which is a particular case of it). If one has a con-
sequence relation ` it can be interpreted semantically: T ` a means every
model of T is a model of a, and T 6` a means there is a model of T which is
not a model of a. So to be a model or not to be a model, that is the question.
No matter how \truth in a model" is dened (using several designated values,
interpretations, accessibility relations, etc.), what is important is that at the
end we have the dichotomy true in a model / false in a model.
In fact if we have a consequence relation, it is always possible to nd a biva-
lent semantics for it, just by taking as models, characteristic functions of some
theories. As Suszko puts it: \In short, every logic is (logically) two-valued"
([34], p.378). Suszko indeed provided a bivalent semantics for  Lukasiewicz's
three many-valued logic L3 (see [33]). This may sound as a paradox since
L3 is called a three many-valued logic because it cannot be dened with a
two-valued matrix. But Suszko's semantics is not a matricial semantics. The
values 0 and 1 in this semantics are not the domain of an algebra, there are
not algebraic values but logical values, following Suszko's terminology.
7
Very often the principle of bivalence is confused with the principle of excluded middle
and sometimes with the principle of contradiction. This confusion has been discussed in
[19] and [12] and will not be treated it. We have tried here to give a formulation of this
principle which avoids confusions.
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In the case of propositional classical logic, algebraic values and logical val-
ues coincide in some sense because the characteristic functions of the maximal
theories can be viewed at the same time as homomorphims from the set of
formulas into the Boolean algebra on f0; 1g. But in most of the cases this
does not happen. So one must make clear the distinction between logical val-
ues and algebraic values. In the case of L3, we have two semantics, one with
two logical values and a semantics with three algebraic values. But there are
logics which cannot be characterized by (nite) matrices and therefore that
have no semantics with algebraic values. This is the case for example of the
paraconsistent logic C1 of da Costa (cf. [15], [4]). For this logic, a semantics
with two logical values was provided [16]. Later on da Costa and his pupils
developed a general theory of logic based on such kind of semantics under the
name \theory of valuation" (cf. [17], [18]).
For Suszko, \any multiplication of logical values is a mad idea and, in fact,
 Lukasiewicz did not actualize it" ([34], p.378). But what is exactly a logical
value? Does the dichotomy algebraic value / logical value admit no third
possibility? The aim of this paper is to present many-valued semantics where
the values are not algebraic values in Suszko's sense, they are not elements of
the algebra of a logical matrix. But we will not be mad enough to call these
values logical values since, as in the matrix case, we will make a distinction
between designated and undesignated values, in order to dene logical truth
and logical consequence.
One can wonder why introducing such kind of many-valued semantics since
every logic is two-valued.  Lukasiewicz's logic L3 has a bivalent semantics, so
why multiplying the values and introducing a three-valued semantics? The
reason is that this three-valued semantics gives a totally dierent look at L3
and is a very useful technical tool to prove theorems of L3 and metatheorems
about L3.
8
Non truth-functional (i.e. non matricial) many-valued semantics
were introduced (cf. [3]) for the study of the paraconsistent logic C1 which
doesn't have truth-functional semantics. As we have already said, this logic
has a bivalent semantics. But the use of a many-valued semantics can give a
better intuition of C1 and simplies the proof, in the same way as the three-
valued matricial semantics does for L3, even if this many-valued semantics is
not truth-functional.
Non truth-functional many-valued semantics are a useful tool for the study
of logics. As in the case of matricial semantics, the additional values are
philosophically ambiguous, and in some sense they preserve the principle of
bivalence through the dichotomy designated/undesignated values. But as in
the case of matrix semantics it is also possible to use these non truth-functional
8
And vice versa. The non truth-functional bivalent semantics for L3 was introduced by
Suszko rather as an \exercice de style", and it didn't seem to have further utility. However
this semantics was used later on to provided a sequent-calculus for L3 (see [9]) using the
close connection between bivalent semantics and sequent calculus.
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semantics to generate logics which are many-valued in a deeper sense.
9
3 The standard denition of many-valued logic
3.1 Logical matrices
A logical matrix M is a structure hA; D i where A is an abstract algebra
hA ; fun i and D is a subest of the domain of the algebra A .
fun is a nite sequence of nitary functions (i.e. functions of nite arity)
dened on A , called truth-functions. The type of the algebra is the specication
of the length of this sequence and the arity of each truth-function. Elements
of A are called values, an element of A is called a designated value if it is also
a member of D , undesignated value otherwise. Given a cardinal , a -valued
matrix is a matrix where the domain of values is of cardinality .
A typical example of logical matrix is the 2-valued matrix of classical
propositional logic: hhf0; 1g;:;_;^;!i; f1gii. It is important to note that
here, the sign \!", for example, represents a truth-function and not a connec-
tive. Generally people use the same name, as we did, for truth-function and
for connectives. This is a useful device but it can be sometimes misleading
(see [10]). This 2-valued matrix is many-valued in the sense that \2 is many".
But according to the standard convention a many-valued matrix is a matrix
of cardinality superior or equal to three.
3.2 Logics
There are many ways to dene what is a logical structure, we consider here
three basic types of logical structures: L1= hF ; `
1
i, L2= hF ; `
2
i, L3= hF ;
`
3
i.
For all these structures, F is an absolutely free algebra of type hF; con i. An
element a of the domain F is called a formula. con is a sequence of functions
called connectives which generate F from a subset P of F. An element p of P
is called an atomic formula. A set of formulas T is called a theory.

`
1
is a subset of F, elements of `
1
are called tautologies.

`
2
is a binary relation bewteen theories and formulas. It is called a conse-
quence relation.

`
3
is a binary relation between theories and theories. It is called a multiple-
consequence relation.
Hereafter we will use the word logic as a generic term for these three kinds
of structure.
9
G.Malinowski has used many-valued matrix to dene consequence relations which are
dierent than the usual one, which are in some sense more many-valued (see [27]). It is
possible to use non truth-functional many-valued semantics in a similar way.
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3.3 Many-valued logics generated by logical matrices
Logical matrices are used to generate logics. With a logical matrix, one can
generate a logic of type 1, 2 or 3 by a uniform method.
Given a matrix M = hA; D i, we consider an absolutely free algebra F of
the same type as A and the set HOM of homomorphisms between F and A.
An element of HOM will be called a morpho-valuation. A function from
the set P of generators of F to the domain A of the algebra A is called an
atomic morpho-valuation. Due to the fundamental property of absolutely
free algebras, any atomic morpho-valuation has a unique extension which is
a morpho-valuation. Thus, it is the same to consider morpho-valuations or
atomic morpho-valuations, since there is a one-to-one correspondence between
them.
Using the notion of morpho-valuations, we now dene sets and relations
on the domain of F , which lead to the three basic types of logical structure.
For any formula a and theories T , U :

`
1
a i for every morpho-valuation , (a) is a designated value.

T `
2
a i for every morpho-valuation , if (b) is a designated value for
every element b of T , then (a) is a designated value.

T `
3
U i for every morpho-valuation , if (b) is a designated value for
every element b of T , then there is an element c of U , such that (c) is a
designated value.
Given a logic L, one say that a matrix M characterizes L, or that M is a
characteristic matrix for L, i L is the logic generated by M.
According to the standard denition of many-valued logic, a logic is not
a -valued logic if it is, or can be, generated by a -valued matrix. If this
would be the denition, classical propositional logic would be a 242-valued
logic since in fact it is not diÆcult to see that it can be generated by matrices
of any cardinality superior to 1.
A logic L is said to be -valued i  is the smallest cardinal such that
there exists a -valued matrix which characterizes L. A typical example of
many-valued logic is  Lukasiewicz's three-valued logic, which is generated by a
three-valued, and cannot be characterized by a two-valued matrix. Concerning
the cardinality of \many", the same convention applies here as in the case of
matrices: the two-valued classical logic is not called a many-valued logic, a
many-valued logic is a logic which is at least 3-valued.
4 Non truth-functional many-valuedness
4.1 Truth-functional logics
What is a truth-functional logic? Classical propositional logic is truth-functional,
but what about intuitionistic logic? the various modal logics? etc.
121
Beziau
One could just say that a truth-functional logic is a logic that can be
characterized by a logical matrix. However this denition seems too weak,
since following it, quite every logic would be truth-functional: according to a
famous theorem, whose original idea is due to Lindenbaum, any logic of type
1 which is structural, i.e. close under substitutions, can be characterized by a
matrix. And this theorem can be generalized in some sense to logic of types
2 and 3 (see [38]).
A reasonable denition runs as follows: a truth-functional logic is a logic
that can be characterized by a nite matrix. In this sense, intuitionistic, stan-
dard modal logics (S5, S4, K, etc..), the paraconsistent logic C1, Jaskowski's
discussive logic and many other logics are not truth-functional.
10
4.2 Non truth-functional semantics
Following our denition of truth-functional logic, we can say that a truth-
functional semantics is a nite matrix. According to this denition a non
truth-functional semantics is any semantics which is not a nite matrix. This
denition is quite vague if we don't specify what is a semantics.
We can give a very general denition of a semantics for a logic: a semantics
is a structure hR;modi where R is a set of objects called representations, and
mod a function from the set of formulas to the power set of R, which associates
to each formula a the set mod(a) of representations in which a is true.
For example in the case of L3, representations are homomorphisms from F
to the algebra of the matrix and the function mod is dened by:  2 mod(a)
i (a) is designated. In the case of modal logics, representations are frames,
and the function mod is dened by:  2 mod(a) i a is true in every possible
worlds of the frame .
11
Let us now consider a very simple example of non truth-functional seman-
tics, a bivalent one. We consider an algebra of formulas F built only with two
connectives, : and !, and we dene a set of functions B from F into f0; 1g
as follows:  2 B i

(a! b) = 0 i (a) = 1 and (b) = 0

if (a) = 1 then (:a) = 0.
The connective : is dened by just \half" of the condition for classical nega-
tion. The logic generated by this semantics (taking 1 as designated) is called
10
One can generate logics with logical matrices in dierent other ways than the one ex-
plained in the preceding section. For example, Godel has shown that intuitionistic logic
cannot be characterized by a nite matrix [22], but Jaskowski has shown that it can be
dened by a set of nite matrices [23]. Carnielli has recently proposed a new method to
generate logics using logical matrices, using this method one can use nite matrices to de-
ne the paraconsistent logic C1 (cf. [14]). Anyway it seems that at the present time, this
denition of truth-functionality is the more reasonable one.
11
More about this general denition of semantics can be found in [5], [7].
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K=2 and has been studied in [8]. In this paper it has been shown in particular
that classical logic is translatable in K=2. This logic is paracomplete in the
sense that a formula and its negation can both be false. If we introduce a
disjunction in a natural way, the formula :(a _ :a) is not a tautology.
The set of bivaluations B is not a set of homomorphims and in particular
cannot be generated from atomic bivaluations, i.e. functions from P to f0; 1g.
The behaviour of bivaluations for negation can be illustrated by the following
table:
12
p :p ::p :::p
0 0 0 0
0 0 0 1
0 0 1 0
0 1 0 0
0 1 0 1
1 0 0 0
1 0 0 1
1 0 1 0
TABLE 1
We can interpret this non truth-functional semantics saying that the value
of :a is \not determined" by the value of a: if the value of a formula a is 1,
the value of :a must be 0, but if its value is 0, the value of :a can be 0 or 1.
However in this semantics, the behaviour of the implication is determin-
istic in the sense that if we know the values of the two direct subformulas
of a conditional, we know the value of this conditional. The behaviour of
bivaluations for implication can be described by the following table:
12
It would be misleading to call such a table, a \truth-table", the similarity is rather visual
than conceptual, since this table does not describe a truth-function. Anyway this kind of
table can be used as a decidability method. When we say that this table is an \illustration",
this means precisely this: given any bivaluation of B , its restriction to the set of formulas
which appear in the rst line of the table, coincides with one of the other lines of the table;
and any of these lines can be extended to a bivaluation of B . This kind of tables were
presented for the rst-time in [16].
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p q p! q
0 0 1
0 1 1
1 0 0
TABLE 2
4.3 Examples of non-truth functional many-valued semantics
We will explain what is a non truth-functional many-valued semantics, gen-
eralizing the preceding example of non truth-functional bivalent semantics,
to a three-valued non truth-functional semantics. In a three-valued truth-
functional semantics, the value of the negation of a formula is determined by
the value of this formula. For example in the case of the three-valued matrix
of  Lukasiewicz, if the value of a formula is 1/2, the value of its negation is
1/2. Now in a three-valued non truth-functional semantics, given a value for
a formula, the value of its negation is not determined.
Let us consider a three-valued non truth-functional semantics with three
values f%; 0; 1g, where only 1 is considered as designated, dened by the
following conditions:  2 T i

(a ! b) is undesignated i (a) = 1 and (b) is undesignated

(a) = 0 i (:a) = 1.

(a) = 1 i (:a) = 0.
The behaviour of threevaluations for negation can be described as follows:
p :p ::p
% % %
% % 0
% 0 1
0 1 %
0 1 0
1 % %
1 % 0
1 0 1
TABLE 3
124
Beziau
The logic dened by this three-valued non truth-functional semantics is
in fact the same as K=2. This can be explained as follows: in the case of
the bivalent non truth-functional semantics, given p and :p, there are three
possibilities than can be described by the following table:
p :p
0 0
0 1
1 0
TABLE 4
Now in the three-valued non truth-functional semantics, these three possi-
bilities are described by the three-values, as illustrated by the following table:
p
%
0
1
TABLE 5
The reader can check that the TABLE 3 is a reduction, in this spirit,
of TABLE 1. This kind of reduction can be systematized by the following
denition: given a bivaluation  of the bivalent non truth-functional semantics
for K=2 we dene a threevaluation 

as follows:


(a) = % i (a) = 0 and (:a) = 0


(a) = 0 i (a) = 0 and (:a) = 1


(a) = 1 i (a) = 1 and (:a) = 0
It is easy to see that with this method we get a one-to-one correspondence
between B and T such that: (a) is designated i 

(a) is designated. This
proves that the logic generated by B and T are the same, namely K=2.
We can say that in the three-valued non truth-functional semantics for
K=2, some information about the value of :p is already given by the value
of p. However this does not mean that the value of :p is \determined" by
the value of p. Therefore one may have some doubts about the usefulness of
this semantics. The number of values has been increased and we still have
indetermination, moreover the implication which was truth-functional is now
getting non truth-functional, since the TABLE 2 must be replaced by the
following one:
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p q p! q
% % 1
% 0 1
% 1 1
0 % 1
0 0 1
0 1 1
1 % %
1 % 0
1 0 %
1 0 0
1 1 1
TABLE 6
When the value of p is 1 and the value of q is undesignated, % or 0, then
the value of p! q is not determined because it can be % or 0.
Let us see now a more convincing example of non truth-functional many-
valued semantics. Imagine that we modify the denition of B adding the
following condition:

if (a! b) = 0 and (b) 6= (:b) then (:(a! b)) = 1
This condition can be described by the following table:
p q :q p! q :(p! q)
0 0 0 1 0
0 0 1 1 0
0 1 0 1 0
1 0 0 0 0
1 0 0 0 1
1 0 1 0 1
1 1 0 1 0
TABLE 7
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In this table, we need to introduce not only direct subformulas but also
negations of direct subformulas of the conditional.
Now we can \translate" this semantics in a three-valued non-truth func-
tional semantics, adding to the two conditions which dene T, the \transla-
tion" of the above condition:

if (a! b) = 0 and (b) = 0 then (:(a! b)) = 1
which can be described by the following table:
p q p! q :(p! q)
% % 1 0
% 0 1 0
% 1 1 0
0 % 1 0
0 0 1 0
0 1 1 0
1 % % %
1 % % 0
1 % 0 1
1 0 0 1
1 1 1 0
TABLE 8
The subformula :q does not appear neither in the above condition nor in
the corresponding table. The three-valued non-truthfunctional semantics has
the subformula property but not the bivalent non-truthfunctional semantics.
That is basically what we have gained.
5 Conclusion
If this paper we have presented the concept of many-valued non-truth func-
tional semantics, in particular comparing it to many-valued truth-functional
semantics and bivalent non-truth functional semantics. We have tried to show
the usefuleness of this concept through an example of a three-valued non-truth
functional semantics. But of course there are other examples. One can develop
four-valued non-truth functional semantics, etc.
These non truth-functional many-valued semantics basically keep a biva-
lence feature through the distinction between designated and undesignated
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values, but this is also the case of matricial truth-functional many-valued se-
mantics, so it cannot be considered as an argument against them, unless it is
also considered as an argument against standard many-valued logics.
From the point of view of truth-functional many-valuedness, a many-valued
logic is a logic that cannot be characterized by a two-valued matrix. If we want
to generalize this denition to non truth-functional many-valuedness, we face
a problem since any logic can be characterized by a two-valued non truth-
functional semantics.
Anyway it seems that the standard concept of many-valued logic is quite
confuse. In fact if we do not limit the matricial denition of many-valued
logic to logic that can be characterized by nite matrices, any logic is many-
valued (due to Lindenbaum's theorem), except classical logic, which is not by
convention, considering that 2 is not enough to be \many". It seems to us
that the standard concept of many-valued logic should be withdrawn: logics
which can be characterized by nite matrices should simply be called truth-
functional, with the addition of the smallest cardinality for which they can be
characterized by a matrix.
On the other hand the expression \many-valued semantics" should be kept
but its meaning should be extended in order to include not only nite or
innite matrices, but also non truth-functional many-valued semantics.
These many-valued semantics are useful tools for the study of logics dened
as set of tautologies or consequence relations, but can also be used in a more
radical way to generate logics which challenge the principle of bivalence in a
deeper sense, and which truly deserve the name \many-valued logics".
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